GP Short Notes

GP Short Notes # 565, 22 August 2021

Russia: For Moscow, the Central Asian concerns are crucial in the Taliban's Afghanistan
Vaishnavi Iyer

What happened?
On 17 August, the Russian ambassador to Afghanistan Dmitry Zhirnov praised the Taliban's conduct and described its approach as "good, positive and business-like." He said the Taliban had made Kabul safer than it was under the previous authorities. Dmitry Zhirnov, called the Taliban "reasonable guys" following a "positive and constructive meeting". He added that the Taliban guaranteed the Russian embassy's security.

On 19 August, Sergey Lavrov said: "We see encouraging signs from the Taliban who say they would like to have a government that includes other political forces." On 20 August, Zhirnov described the situation in Afghanistan as one of cautious hope and said that "it should be better" calling for the Taliban to take socio-economic measures to help boost development.

What's the background?
First, the return of Russia into Afghanistan after the 1989 exit. Moscow left Afghanistan badly wounded and having lost to the US-Mujiahideen-ISI combine after fighting the entire 1980s. In the 1990s, preoccupied with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Moscow watched the rise of the Taliban with less influence in Afghanistan. In the 2000s, Russia remained under Putin started looking at Central Asia and Afghanistan closely. In May 2009, Russia began seeking improved relations with the Taliban in the "Russia Afghan Forum"; owing to the inevitable need to maintain good relations with not only the government representatives but also the Pashtun groups.

Second, Moscow's Central Asian interests in Afghanistan. Russia has been looking towards stabilizing the regional engagement with its post-soviet neighbours. The economic and political interests in Central Asia are crucial for Russia's rise under Putin. Russia has engaged in military exercises with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and East Xinjiang. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan share borders with Afghanistan. These borders are not only physical but also ethnic, as Central Asia shares Uzbek and Tajik populations with Afghanistan.

Third, the American factor in Afghanistan for Moscow. All big neighbours of Afghanistan – Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran have grown sceptical about the US presence in Afghanistan. In 2018, Moscow was accused of arming the Taliban and providing financial support and bounties to kill US troops. The Kremlin denied these allegations; however, many in the US believe that Moscow has not forgotten what happened in the 1980s, and would want to return the favour to the US.

Fourth, Russia's recent interests in the Afghan dialogues. Moscow has acted as a host and sponsored several initiatives calling for diplomatic talks with 11 other regional leaders, including China, the US, India and Pakistan. Russia regularly indulged in special envoys to meet with the US and other diplomatic initiatives like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization-Afghanistan Contact Group. There were reports even of Russia supporting a "Moscow Shura" of the Taliban.

What does it mean?
First, the Russian government is confident about the intentions of the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, it has declared that it would not be making any unilateral decisions on giving the Taliban a dejure recognition. As per the 2003 status, the Taliban remains a terrorist group. Russia has assured that it will only change its status if the United Nations does. 

Second, Russia is now interested in filling the void created by the US exit, with its main focus on securing regional cooperation with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to secure Central Asian stability. Russia may have to adopt to new realities in Afghanistan and pursue its strategy accordingly. 

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